Descripción

Supported by ten years of research, Wigmore has gathered extensive data covering the 2008 financial crisis and subsequent recovery to provide the first comprehensive history of the period. Financial crises cannot occur unless institutional investors finance the bubbles that created them. Wigmore follows the trail of data putting pressure on institutional investors to achieve higher levels of returns that led to over-leverage throughout the financial system and placed such a burden on recovery. Here is a 'very good picture - and painful reminder - of the crisis' evolution across multiple asset classes, structures, participants, and geographies.' This work serves as a critical analysis of modern portfolio management and an important reference work for financial professionals, academics, investors, and students.

The first comprehensive history of the 2008 financial crisis incorporating the problems across many asset classes, categories of investors, and homebuyers.

Easily understood charts and tables explain how the financial crisis of 2008 was created.

Helps financial professionals, economists, regulators, and investors evaluate excesses in multiple financial sectors.